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8.1 Introduction
It is now time to take stock and to see how the arguments presented by the various 
authors can be used to answer the questions raised in Chapter 1. These questions are:
-  what are the advantages and disadvantages of the Rhineland model relative to 
the Anglo-Saxon model for structuring the economy?
-  are the changes in the Netherlands an example for the necessary changes in 
the Federal Republic of Germany and other Member States of the European 
Union?
-  will the increased internationalisation and the strife for integration in Europe 
result in a uniform structuring of the European economies?
Section 8.2 contains a comparison of the Rhineland model and the Anglo-Saxon 
model in order to answer the question whether differences in the institutional 
settings between these two models of capitalism correlate with economic perform­
ance. One of these factors is employability. This is the employees' capability to react 
to changing conditions. Vocational education enhances the adaptability of 
employees and the receptiveness to innovation. According to Soskice et al. (Chapter 
2 in this volume) wage dispersion and numerical flexibility (temporary contracts) 
might undercut the attractiveness to young people of investing in lower-level 
apprenticeships, increasing the pool of low-paid unskilled labour. Hence, there 
seems to be a trade-off between employability and flexibility. In our view the 
growing competition created by the internationalisation of economies implies that 
employability will become an important aspect of the competitiveness of countries. 
We therefore devote an entire section, Section 8.3, to the trade-off between 
employability and flexibility. Section 8.4 answers the question raised in the title of 
this book and deals with the lessons Germany and the Netherlands can learn from 
each other. Section 8.5 addresses the question whether there is a trend towards a 
uniform institutional structure of the economies in Europe. The chapter concludes 
with Section 8.6 on the relevancy of institutions and culture.
8.2 The Rhineland and Anglo-Saxon Model Compared
The economies of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Netherlands are 
examples of the Rhineland model. They are characterised by relatively much
government involvement, a general welfare state, tripartism (cooperation) as 
coordinating device and long-term relationships. These countries may be viewed as 
consensus economies. The Rhineland model works on the assumption that 
institutional arrangements exist to overcome various market failures and may 
therefore be beneficial to national economic performance. The United States of 
America (USA) and the United Kingdom (UK) are variants of the Anglo-Saxon 
model, characterised by little government involvement, a residual welfare state, 
coordination by the market (competition) and short-term relationships. The USA and 
the UK may be viewed as free market economies. The Anglo-Saxon model works on 
the assumption that the only correction for one market imperfection is yet another 
market imperfection. Non-market institutions and regulations are considered causes 
for rigidities (Eurosclerosis). Government intervention should only occur as a last 
resort.
In Chapter 1 we illustrated that during the 1973-1995 period the two types of 
models differ with respect to the income distribution and the size of the government 
sector. In the Rhineland countries income is always more evenly distributed and 
government expenditures make up a greater part of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
than in the Anglo-Saxon countries. Based on macroeconomic criteria it is concluded 
that the UK performed worse than the other three countries. Relative to the 
Rhineland countries, the other Anglo-Saxon economy, the USA, has a slightly 
higher growth rate of GDP, a significantly higher employment-population ratio and 
a lower level of long-term unemployment. One of the two Rhineland countries 
outperforms the other economies under consideration related to the unemployment 
rate, the inflation rate and growth in unit labour costs. This description of the 
different aspects of the four economies also illustrates that both the Rhineland model 
and the Anglo-Saxon model are inadequate to typify reality. Despite similarities, the 
countries that are grouped in one of the two models show significant differences in 
both institutions and performance. Although, the Rhineland model forms the basic 
structure of the Dutch economy, it contains more elements of the Anglo-Saxon 
model than the German economy. For example, the Dutch financial system is bank- 
based but the stock market is much more important than the German stock markets 
(see Hoogduin and Huisman, Chapter 5 in this volume). The Dutch labour market is 
also more flexible than the German one (Schmid and Helmer, Chapter 3 in this 
volume). Moreover, although in both countries wage bargaining takes place at the 
sectoral level, there are also important differences in this bargaining process (see 
Chapters 2 and 4). In this section we use the results of previous chapters to assess 
the performance of both systems with regard to the following issues: economic 
growth, the efficiency of social insurance, the trade-off between equality and 
efficiency. The trade-off between employability and flexibility is dealt with in the 
next section.
The level and growth of GDP per capita are disaggregated by Schmid and 
Helmer (Chapter 3). GDP per capita is highest in the USA. However, the level of 
labour productivity (GDP per hour in 1994) is highest in the Netherlands, whereas 
the German and American level is of about the same size (the UK was not included 
in their analysis). The number of hours worked per person is lowest in the two
Rhineland countries and, moreover, declined during 1983-1994. During this period 
the growth in GDP per capita was almost identical in these three countries, but the 
increase of the number of employed (compared to total population) was higher in the 
Rhineland countries than in the USA. These results illustrate that in both systems 
GDP per capita can grow at the same level, while in the USA this is arrived by 
employing relatively many people and in the Rhineland countries by high 
productivity rates. The choice between the two depends upon the community's 
appreciation of leisure and the size of the social safety net. The latter is determined 
by the willingness of the employed to transfer part of their income to those who are 
temporary or permanently unable to participate in the working process. The degree 
of solidarity is in its turn a reflection of the importance of collectivism in the 
society's values (see Section 8.6).
The share of public social expenditures is higher in the European countries 
(including the UK) than in the USA. However, in Chapter 4 Van de Meerendonk 
showed that these differences disappear if  account is taken of private social 
expenditures. Total social expenditures appear to be of the same level in the UK, the 
USA and the Netherlands, whereas the number is slightly higher in Germany (Table 
4.10). In general the social benefit payments in the Rhineland countries are higher 
than in the UK and the USA (Table 4.11). The same conclusion can be drawn 
concerning the replacement rates of employment benefits (Table 4.12).
Okun has postulated a trade-off between equality and efficiency. According 
to Okun (1975, p. 1) inequalities in living standard and material wealth "reflect a 
system of rewards and penalties that is intended to encourage efficiency and channel 
it into socially productive activity. To the extent that the system succeeds, it 
generates an efficient society. But that pursuit of efficiency necessarily creates 
inequalities. And hence, society faces a trade-off between equality and efficiency". 
Van de Meerendonk (Chapter 4 in this volume) illustrates that during the last decade 
in the Anglo-Saxon countries the dispersion in earnings has increased, whereas in 
the Rhineland countries it has remained at approximately the same level (Table 
4.16). Even more important is that for German low-paid workers the probability to 
move to a higher level of income is greater than for their American counterparts 
(Table 4.17). Moreover in the European countries (Germany, Netherlands and UK) 
the social security systems contribute significantly more to the elimination of 
poverty than that in the USA (Table 4.18). Given the fact that the total amount of 
expenses on social security (as a percentage of GDP) are of approximately the same 
size this implies that the European systems are more efficient in reducing poverty. 
Hence income is most unequally distributed in the Anglo-Saxon countries, but these 
countries do not systematically outperform Germany and the Netherlands on 
efficiency criteria such as the GDP per capita and the efficiency of the social 
security system. These results suggest that for the industrialised countries the trade­
off between equality and efficiency is rather flat.
8.3 The Employability-Flexibility Trade-Off
The growing competition created by the internationalisation of economies and the 
expanding European Union (EU) implies that international differences in the 
patterns of employment and unemployment increasingly depend on the capacity of 
national economies to innovate and to absorb new technology. Human capital will 
become more important in explaining international trade (Baily et al. 1993; Porter 
1990). Human capital is beyond skills and knowledge. It also refers to people's 
ability to work together for a common purpose (social capital). The latter depends 
on trust. Only those societies with a high degree of social trust will be able to create 
the flexible, large-scale business organisations that are needed to compete in the new 
global economy (Fukujama 1996, p. 10). Recent research results support Fukujama's 
1996 argument that trust facilitates all large-scale activities, not just those of the 
government (see La Porta et al. 1997).
Accessible education is of importance, certainly for open economies that 
become more influenced by international competition. There is an increasing 
awareness that human capital in technology driven economies becomes a decisive 
factor in contributing to economic performance. In the 1990 report Labour Market 
Policies for the 1990s, the OECD concludes that the emerging 'skill gap' not only 
results from future demographic developments and technological trends, but also 
from the maladjustment of the education and training system to the world of work. 
Forecasting skill needs are unreliable. This puts a premium on flexibility. The key 
objective must be to impart to all young people a broad base of transferable skills. 
Both schools and employers are responsible. For adults, the private sector must 
assume primary responsibility for the provision of training and retraining oppor­
tunities (OECD 1990, p. 64). By expanding training opportunities for employed 
workers, and, hence, making them more employable both elsewhere in their current 
firm and in other firms, and by easing the consequences ofjob loss (through training 
or through the labour market exchange) the stage can be set for more flexible and 
hence more productive employment systems.
The present flexibilisation and deregulation trends, will be intensified by the 
European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), resulting in higher mobility, a 
growing number of flexible jobs and more insecurity. These developments may be 
detrimental to the necessary investment in human capital by employers and 
employees. The flexibilisation is accompanied by a decentralisation of industrial 
relations. Also the latter may be detrimental to investments in human capital for a 
number of reasons. Despite the fact that individual employers are convinced of the 
importance of investment in human capital and better industrial relations, actions 
towards these goals will not be achieved, because they are trapped in a prisoners 
dilemma. Investment in human capital not only has positive internal effects, but also 
has considerable external effects. In the short-term, however, it puts the individual 
employer in a cost disadvantage relative to its competitors. The prisoners dilemma 
and the related free-rider problem can only be avoided by agreements at national or 
sectoral level. Also the administrative extension, that make collective agreements 
generally binding, like in Germany and the Netherlands, is an answer to this free­
rider problem. Moreover, as has been shown in the previous Chapters 2 and 4, the
wage determination has an important relationship with the training system. The 
consensus economies are in a favourable position in this respect. Collective 
agreements facilitate schooling and other skill-upgrading arrangements. Centralised 
collective agreements offer the opportunity to the trade unions to make a swap 
between wages and training or other issues, like employment and working 
conditions, affirmative action, child care, prevention of sick leave, employment of 
minorities, etc.. Hence, wage moderation is more easy to achieve at the central level, 
compared with decentralised bargaining. When trade unions take part in economic 
governance they will be less inclined to rent-seeking behaviour than trade unions in 
free market economies. In the latter case insiders' interests will prevail. 
Decentralised wage negotiations at the establishment level may result in a hold-up 
problem. Players retain their specific investment since they expect that future 
bargaining on the distribution of the surplus due to specific investments, will deprive 
them of part of the returns. This hold-up problem may be avoided by sectoral 
negotiations as is the case in Germany and the Netherlands and provide a type of 
flexibility that is not available in decentralised economies like the USA and the UK, 
where the enterprise is the dominant level (see also Teulings 1997).
From this and the previous section we conclude that none of the two models 
of capitalism always dominates the other. Both system can generate the same growth 
rates. A more equal income distribution does not lead to less efficiency. The way 
each of the two models arrive at these results differs and, as will briefly discussed in 
Section 8.5, depends upon the society's values. There are signs that due to its high 
degree of flexibility, the Anglo-Saxon model performance better than the Rhineland 
model during periods of structural changes. As the discussion in this section reveals 
care should be taken that the flexibility does not harm the employability and in this 
way prospects of long-term growth.
8.4 Are the Netherlands an Example for Germany?
8.4.1 Introduction
During almost the entire post-World War II period, the economic system of the 
Federal Republic of Germany was regarded as the role model for many European 
countries. For example, the low inflation reputation of the Bundesbank has been an 
argument for the members of the Exchange Rate Mechanism of the European 
Monetary System to peg their currency to the Deutschmark. The Netherlands can be 
regarded as the country that in the most strict sense has implemented this strategy of 
following the German monetary policy (see Chapter 5 by Hoogduin and Huisman 
and Chapter 6 by Jochimsen). The Dutch competition policy is another field of 
economic policy in which the Netherlands follows Germany as Gradus showed in 
Chapter 7.
The recent admiration for the strong employment growth delivered by the 
Dutch Delta model raises the question whether we have come to a point in time at 
which the roles will be or should be reversed: Germany follows the Netherlands 
instead of the opposite. With a view to answer this question we briefly describe the 
political measures, Section 8.4.2, and external circumstances, Section 8.4.3, which 
are responsible for this Dutch success. In Section 8.4.5 we put some critical remarks 
to the main elements of the Dutch employment miracle. Finally, in Section 8.4.6 we 
answer the question whether Germany should and could follow the Dutch example.
8.4.2 Political Measures
Wage moderation is an important explanation for the strong employment growth in 
the Netherlands since 1982. In the 1980s, average real wage increases in the 
Netherlands were below average productivity increases, resulting in additional jobs 
for over 400,000 persons (CPB 1991). At the same time the Dutch guilder 
appreciated. As came forward from previous Chapters 2 and 4, in the Netherlands 
the profitability of the manufacturing sector increased significantly, while the 
German manufacturing firms had to lower their prices in order to maintain their 
international market share. German profitability rates declined. For the greater part 
of the period concerned, the effective exchange rate of the guilder appreciated. The 
direct effect of this appreciation could be a drop of the profits margins. However, in 
the Netherlands the negative influence of the appreciation of the currency was 
overcompensated by the real wage moderation, so that on balance the profits could 
rise. On the other hand the appreciation of the Deutschmark was at the expense of 
the Germany's competitiveness (see Van Riel and Metten 1996; European Economy 
1996, 61).
The wage moderation in the Netherlands was supported by the disengagement 
of the coupling mechanism and tax relief. The latter consisted of a general tax relief 
policy and selective tax reductions at the lower end of the labour market, in order to
promote employment. These measures reduced the wedge end thus enabled the trade 
unions to support and prolong the moderate-wage policy. The tax relief was made 
possible by the success of the fiscal consolidation that started in 1982. At that time 
the Dutch fiscal deficit was at its maximum (6.9% of GDP) (CPB 1994, p. 180) and 
the debt to GDP ratio was increasing fastly. In the Netherlands the reform of the 
social security system, has laid a solid base for fiscal policy consolidation, as Van de 
Meerendonk has pointed out in Chapter 4.
The fiscal consolidation also created room for additional expenditures in the 
1990s, in particular for subsidies to employ people who are unemployed for a long 
period ('Melkert-jobs'). Finally, the budget came under control, which was a sign for 
the financial market that the Dutch government was willing and able to take 
disagreeable measures, if  necessary. In this way the budgettary policy supported the 
central bank's monetary policy.
The central element of the Dutch monetary policy has been to peg the Dutch 
guilder to the Deutschmark (see Jochimsen, Chapter 6 in this volume). The ultimate 
aim of this policy is to create a low and stable level of inflation and thus a low level 
of the long-term interest rate. As will be shown in Section 8.4.3, this low level of the 
interest rate has been instrumental in increasing consumption in last years.
Finally, deregulation and privatisation have been another important element 
of Dutch policy during the last decade. Gradus (Chapter 7) described the main 
changes in competition policy in the Federal Republic of Germany and the 
Netherlands. Both Germany and the Netherlands are changing their legislation to 
bring it into line with EU law (see OECD 1996a, pp. 61-66; OECD 1996b, p. 137) 
The results of empirical research on the impact of deregulation of product markets 
are contradictory. For instance, Nickell 1996 found for a large number of enterprises 
in the UK a positive relationship between competition and productivity growth. 
Other research shows that Rhineland enterprises outperform Anglo-Saxon 
enterprises (De Jong 1996). These contradictory conclusions illustrate the difficulty 
to estimate the influence of (de)regulation on the economy. Moreover, a number of 
deregulation measures in the Netherlands, like the Shop Opening Hours Act, the 
Competition Law and the liberalised Establishment Law are too recent to have any 
measurable effect. That is why the alleged Dutch employment miracle cannot be 
explained from more product market functioning, although it may be that on balance 
the effects are positive for employment.
8.4.3 Favourable External Circumstances
A disadvantage of moderate wage increases is that it reduces domestic demand. This 
drop in demand did not occur in the Netherlands because of a number of favourable 
external circumstances (see Delsen and De Jong 1997). In the second half of the 
1980s, the Netherlands profited from the synchronous development of the economic 
situation in the industrial countries. At the beginning of the 1990s, the United States 
and the United Kingdom ended up in a recession, while in Germany expenditure 
increased, related to the construction of former East Germany. Within the European
Union, the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg benefited most from the German 
unification. Calculations by the European Commission (1992, p. 8) show that both 
for the Netherlands and the Belgian-Luxembourger Economic Union (BLEU) the 
German unification resulted in an additional growth of 1.6% over the period mid- 
1990 to end-1991. For the other EU-Member States (Germany not included) the 
calculated impulse was 0.6%.
In the following years also continental Europe was hit by a recession, and 
once again the Netherlands were an exception to the rule. In 1993, the Dutch GDP 
still increased slightly by 0.3%, while on average for Western European GDP 
dropped by 0.5% (CPB 1994, pp. 13 and 15). During this recession and in the first 
part of the recovery (1994 and 1995), the Netherlands benefited from their 
specialisation package. This package is strongly directed at the agricultural sector 
and related activities (the agro-industrial complex) and at the chemical sector (see 
CPB 1993). The demand for agricultural products is relatively insensitive to the 
business cycle. The demand for chemical industry products and other semi­
manufactured articles is high at the beginning of the upturn of the business cycle, 
when stocks have to be replenished. In 1994 and 1995, Dutch industry benefited 
from this. As the economic situation ripens the Dutch specialisation pattern becomes 
more unfavourable. The demand becomes more concentrated on investment goods 
and durable consumption goods, sectors in which the Netherlands are not 
specialised.
Table 8.1 Average mortgage interest and houses completed/sold in the Netherlands, 
1993-1996
Year Average mort- New Houses completed/sold
gage interest mortgages1
(percentages)
x 1000
(a) 
x 1000
(b) 
x 1000
(c) 
x 1000
1993 7,50 339 140 76 84
1994 7,26 431 166 78 87
1995 7,12 406 178 85 94
1996 6,25 563 179 90 89
(a) Total (a) = (b) + (c).
(b) Transactions of all houses sold.
(c) Delivered new estate of houses.
1 Number of new mortgages on houses (including combinations house/business 
premises).
Source: Statistics Netherlands (CBS) and Dutch Association of Real Estate Agents 
(NVM) (transactions of all houses sold).
When in 1996, the Dutch specialisation pattern turned against the Netherlands, it 
was the low interest rate that came to the rescue. In 1996 the low interest rate
resulted in a strong increase in consumptive credits and a growth in the number of 
mortgages. In the second half of 1996, the outstanding amount of consumptive credit 
increased by 890 million guilders to almost 23.5 billion guilders. Never before in a 
six months period, the outstanding amount of consumptive credit increased that 
much (see CBS 1997). Moreover, in the past years the number of contracted 
mortgage loans increased much more than the number of sales of existent houses 
and new buildings (see Table 8.1). This suggests that part of the new mortgages has 
been used to recontract existing mortgages or to finance consumptive expenditures. 
CPB (1997, p. 67) estimates the real capital gains from the increase of prices of 
houses at 50 billion guilders. Probably around 10% of this gain will result in higher 
consumptive spending. The impact of the appreciation of shares is probably much 
less. Both developments may explain the increased confidence of consumers and the 
relative high growth of household's consumption, notably of durable goods. In 1996, 
the volume of the latter increased by 4.25%.
8.4.4 A Dutch Employment Miracle?
The Dutch job-machine seems to be working at full speed. The unemployment rate 
is low, which is a result of the high growth rate of employment. However, the level 
of the latter still is relatively low. Another positive characteristic of the Dutch labour 
market is its high level of labour productivity; in 1994 the Dutch level of GDP per 
hour worked was around 9% above that in Germany, 10% above that in the USA 
and around 22% above the EU average (see Schmid and Helmer, Table 3.2, Chapter 
3 in this volume; OECD 1996a, p. 77).2 Apart from quantity also quality matters. 
Between 1987 and 1994 two thirds of Dutch employment growth was in part-time 
jobs. Between 1994 and 1996 employment growth accelerated. Almost 40% of the 
recent employment growth was in flexible jobs; 60% of the jobs growth was in small 
part-time jobs (< 12 hours) and flexible jobs (fixed-term, on-call and agency work).3 
This may explain why in the Netherlands, the proportion of involuntary part-timers 
is higher than in Germany (see also Schmid and Helmer, Chapter 3 in this volume). 
However, in the Netherlands the growth of part-time employment and of temporary 
jobs is mainly, and even more than in other European countries, supply-side driven; 
relative to other EU countries in the Netherlands a large number of employees prefer 
a part-time job (see Delsen 1995). Considerable proportions of Dutch working men 
and women want to reduce working hours at the same hourly wage rate. It is 
stimulated by change in cultural impediments and reduction in prejudice. There is a 
growing consensus between the social partners on the value of part-time
2The growth rate of the Dutch labour productivity is 
relatively low, so that the level converges towards the lower 
level of other countries.
3These percentages are calculated from Statistics Nether­
lands (CBS) data. For 1996 only data up to the second quarter 
are included.
employment (see Delsen 1997).
The disadvantages of the high share of part-time and flexible contracts can be 
distinguished into two groups: short-term and structural problems. The short-term 
problem is that the Dutch employment miracle may turn out to be an unstable one. 
These marginal jobs are very sensitive to the business cycle; a turn in this cycle 
implies that the Netherlands will immediately -  and more than other EU-Member 
States -  be confronted with considerable lay-offs and increasing unemployment 
figures.
Apart from this short-term impact, flexibilisation of the labour market also 
causes a number of structural problems. One may question whether wage moder­
ation and more deregulated labour markets are a solution to the labour market 
problems at the lower level. The growth of small part-time jobs and flexible jobs 
may result in poverty when no additional income at the individual or household 
level is available. Although employment has increased considerably, the volume of 
work in hours has remained relatively constant. There has been a massive redis­
tribution of work, with a corresponding redistribution of earnings (see Schmid and 
Helmer, Chapter 3 in this volume). Moreover, there is the real danger of segmen­
tation not only between incumbent workers, the insiders, and the unemployed, but 
also between the insiders: a segmentation both of the external and internal labour 
markets (see Delsen and De Jong 1997). Another structural problem occurs because 
the growth of temporary jobs will affect the social infrastructure. The latter may be 
a threat to durable economic growth (Van Dijk 1997). These flexible jobs may also 
negatively affect investments in human capital by employers and employees. An 
active labour market policy can be a solution to at least part of these problems. 
However, as Schmid and Helmer showed, in the Netherlands and Germany the 
expenses for active labour market policy are relatively low.
As came forward from previous Chapters 3 and 4, the relatively high labour 
productivity in the Netherlands is partly due to exclusion -  more than in any other 
EU countries and the USA -  of those employees with relatively low productivity, for 
instance disabled persons through disability benefits and older workers through 
various generous early exit options from the labour market, including early 
retirement, disability for labour market reasons (see also Delsen and Reday-Mulvey 
1996).4 As a consequence, the number of employed is relatively low. This may 
cause problems for financing the government budget and the social insurance.
8.4.5 Should Germany Follow the Dutch Example?
4It should be noted, however, that other institutions also 
matter as came forward from Van de Meerendonk's Chapter 4 in 
this volume. The social climate in the Netherlands is good 
relative to Germany and certainly relative to the UK and the 
USA: stable and peaceful system of industrial relations and 
relatively few days are lost by strikes, resulting in employ­
ees' commitment to the result of a firm and a good basis for 
business training, contributing to productivity.
Now time has come to investigate whether the Federal Republic of Germany should 
and can follow the Dutch example. In Section 8.4.3. we argued that part of the 
Dutch success can be ascribed to good luck. In fact the major part of this luck is that 
the most important neighbour of the Netherlands, Germany, during some time has 
followed an expansionary policy, which had its favourable spinoffs for the 
neighbouring countries. Of course chances are low that Germany will ever have a 
comparable luck. In discussing the other relevant issues we follow the sequence of 
the Sections 8.4.2 and 8.4.4.
Wage moderation forms the essential element of the Dutch model. Can 
Germany generate a wage constraint of a comparable size? With a view toward 
answering this question, a closer look at the wage bargaining process in both 
countries is useful. Both the Netherlands and Germany are characterised by sectoral 
wage negotiations. However, there are considerable differences between these two 
countries, as Soskice et al. and Van de Meerendonk showed in Chapter 2 and 
Chapter 4. In the Netherlands more negotiations take place at the central level, and 
more than in Germany informal coordination takes place of the sectoral level 
negotiations by trade unions and employers' organisations or by the tripartite Socio­
Economic Council. Moreover, in the Netherlands the social partners consult more 
frequently at the central level in the so-called Foundation of Labour. This limits the 
influence of the insiders and may explain why wage moderation has a long history in 
the Netherlands, unlike in Germany. In Germany that coordination is less overt. 
Moreover, there are cultural differences. The German industrial relation system is 
characterised by Tarifautonomie, while in the Netherlands government involvement 
in the wage formation process is common. The Netherlands can be characterised, 
more than Germany, by a consensus economy. The latter may be a reason why the 
January 1996 tripartite Bündnis für Arbeit' already is a failure, while the 1982 
Central Agreement to reduce unemployment in the Netherlands has been and still is 
a success. Taking into account these cultural difference it may be questioned 
whether the overall understanding to negotiate a wage restraint in Germany, 
recommended by Soskice et al. (Chapter 2) as a cure for the German unemployment 
problem, may in fact be feasible. The German federal government finds more 
difficulties in exerting political power than the Dutch, and it may be more difficult 
for the German government to commit the corporatist parties into a comprehensive 
policy framework.
Even if  the German social partners could agree upon a policy of moderate 
wage increases during several years, one can argue that the favourable effects are 
likely to be smaller than in the Dutch case. The arguments for this proposition refer 
to the differences in size and industrial structure of the two economies. Germany is 
the dominant economy of the European Union. This implies that chances are high 
that a policy of wage moderation will be followed by neighbouring countries, so that 
a vicious deflationary policy is set into motion in Europe. Moreover due to the size 
of the economy, the German export sector makes up a smaller part of GDP and 
employment than that of the Netherlands. As a result a wage moderation in Germany 
will almost surely lead to a fall in domestic (and European) demand, so that the 
favourable effects on employment will be lower than they would have been in the
case of the Netherlands. In some sense one can say that the Netherlands have 
exploited their position of a small open economy. Or in other words, a policy of 
wage moderation is a beggar-thy-neighbour policy.
As has been put forward by Soskice et al. the share of the services sector in 
GDP is higher in the Netherlands than in Germany. Services require more low 
skilled and low paid workers than the industry. Moreover, the German industrial 
sector follows a high quality incremental innovation strategy. The Dutch experience 
shows that wage moderation has a negative impact on productivity. Wage 
moderation relieves the pressure on firms to motivate and give workers little 
incentive to acquire new skills (see for instance Kleinknecht 1996). Productivity 
growth in the Netherlands is very modest. The latter may be at the expense of future 
employment growth and competitiveness. According to neoclassical economic 
thinking low productivity leads to low compensation. However, this causality can 
also run in the opposite direction: access to labour at low compensation makes the 
search for productivity increases unnecessary for the employers, and thus 
undermines the high quality incremental innovation strategy of the German industry.
Hence a policy of wage restraint, if  implemented, should be supplemented by 
other measures in order to be effective for reducing unemployment. Possible 
candidates are wage differentials, part-time jobs, liberalisation of product markets 
and fiscal consolidation. Van de Meerendonk pointed out in Chapter 4 that, unlike in 
the UK and the USA, allowing for more wage dispersion may well be an effective 
solution to the high share of low-skilled unemployed in Germany and the 
Netherlands, because these countries have well-functioning systems of vocational 
and company training. Soskice et al. (Chapter 2) are much more sceptical. They 
think that it "might undercut the attractiveness to young people of investing in 
lower-level apprenticeships, thus increasing the pool of low-paid unskilled labour" 
(p. 50). We are of the opinion that these negative effects can be circumvented by 
including compulsory measures for improving skills in wage agreements and in the 
conditions for obtaining unemployment benefits. Hence, as Van de Meerendonk, we 
plea for wage dispersion. Moreover modest wage increases in labour intensive 
sectors, such as services, can be instrumental in boosting these sectors and thus 
increasing their share in German GDP and employment. Such a switch may be 
advantages given the increasing demand for services. The effects of the German 
reunification also deliver an argument for wage dispersion. As a consequence of the 
unification there was a massive wave of migration from the East to the West. 
Unions, employers and government agreed on a national plan for the transition of 
East German wages to West German wages. In addition a huge fiscal transfer 
scheme and a special income tax supplement (solidarity contribution of 7.5% in 
1995) were put in operation to reduce migration. However, the equalisation of real 
wages across Germany poses a danger. Such convergence would cause high 
unemployment, lasting for decades (see Brakman and Garretsen 1997). On the other 
hand wage discipline needed to reduce the eastern unemployment rate to the western 
level would require a widening of the wedge between wages in the two regions for 
an extensive period and either route increases the potential for migration. One 
possible response would be to seek a compromise between convergence of
unemployment and convergence of wages (see Hughes-Hallett et al. 1996).
Although disadvantages are associated with part-time and temporary jobs (see 
Section 8.4.4), these types of jobs are effective in reducing unemployment and 
increasing the employment to population ratio. Whether the number of these 
atypical jobs can be increased substantially in Germany, not only depends upon the 
attitude of German employees but, as the Dutch experience shows, also on a 
consensus between government and social partners on the advantages of part-time 
work. Bringing about such a consensus takes time.5
Regulation of markets can improve the efficient functioning of the market 
economy. In fact no market economy can function appropriately without rules. Too 
much regulation, however, will constrain economic activity. The level of regulation 
in Germany and the Netherlands are of the same magnitude (see Figure 7.1 in 
Chapter 7). In Section 8.4.2 we concluded that although it is difficult to measure the 
effect of deregulation, it might be that in the Netherlands this policy has enhanced 
employment. Assuming that this conclusion correct, we are of the opinion that a 
deliberate deregulation and privatisation policy can be recommended for Germany 
as well.
Fiscal consolidation can have various favourable effects. First, if  part of it 
consists of a reduction of taxes and premiums, the willingness of trade unions to 
accept modest wage increases and the costs of the firms decrease and thus their 
profits increase. The reduction of taxes is also needed for financing the pensions in 
the future. In Germany the majority of pensions is on a pay-as-you-go system. Given 
this system, the ageing of the population implies a sharp increase in expenditures, 
which have to be paid by a steadily decreasing number of people of working age. A 
restructuring is needed of the German pension system towards the Dutch system, 
where a large part of the pensions are financed by funds.
In conclusion, the German problems cannot be solved by simply following 
the Dutch example. The structure of the German industry and the dominant role of 
Germany in Europe make that a policy of moderate wage increases is expected to be 
less effective than it has been in the Netherlands. Other measures taken by the Dutch 
authorities maybe more worthwhile. Examples are: wage dispersion, part-time 
contracts, a modest liberalisation and fiscal consolidation. On the other hand, in our 
view the German system of vocational training serves as an example for the 
Netherlands. Implementing a similar system in the Netherlands can improve the 
employability of the Dutch employees. Maybe we have left the era of leaders and 
followers behind us and time has come for walking hand by hand. As argued by 
Jochimsen in Chapter 6, the creation of the Economic and Monetary Union urges for 
a cooperative behaviour.
8.5 Lessons for the European Union
5The first initiatives of the Dutch government to actively 
promote part-time work date from the end of the 1970s. This 
illustrates the path dependency and the importance of govern­
ments in changing attitudes and culture as well as policies.
Within the European Union there are considerable differences in institutional 
structures between countries. In fact the economies of members of the EU can be 
categorised in at least three models: the Anglo-Saxon model, the Rhineland model 
and the Latin model. This large variance is also found in studies on cultural values 
in different countries. It appears that the differences between the European countries 
are almost as great as those between countries all over the world (see Hofstede 
1993). Previous chapters clearly showed that due to the internationalisation and the 
common market policy, over the past decades the institutional structure of the 
labour markets, the markets for goods and services as well as the financial markets 
in Europe has shifted towards the Anglo-Saxon model, i.e. a shift from non-market 
coordination towards market coordination. This raises the question: will the 
increased internationalisation and the strife for integration in Europe result in a 
uniform structure of the economy, i.e. in one European model? Since the previous 
chapters did not analyse the Latin model we restrict the present discussion to the 
Rhineland and Anglo-Saxon model.
This change to incorporate more Anglo-Saxon features in the economic 
system showed itself in a policy of flexibilisation, deregulation, decentralisation and 
privatisation and was mainly motivated by cost containment and desired flexibility 
to cope with the internationalisation of the economies and the accompanied 
increased competition from foreign countries. The increased importance of Anglo­
Saxon features also implies a shift from long-term aims towards aiming at short­
term results. Increased wage flexibility and improvement of the workings of labour 
markets by means of institutional changes are indeed advantageous in the short-run, 
however, they are detrimental to commitment, to the willingness of workers to adapt 
to technological change and discourage innovation, as has been argued by Soskice et 
al. in Chapter 2 (see also Kleinknecht 1996). Limitations on flexibility offer the 
needed stability; they not only involve costs, as supposed by neoclassical 
economics, but also increase productivity and adaptability. Since a high level of 
commitment is typical for the Rhineland model and flexibility for the Anglo-Saxon 
model, we are of the opinion that a particular system of capitalism does not 
dominate the other systems every time and everywhere.
Not every time, because the preference for an economic system depends upon 
the specific economic environment. In general, due the relatively high level of 
committment, the Rhineland model works well in a stable economic environment. 
Consultation leads to an improvement of the quality of the products and processes. 
The fact that consultation takes time is then relatively unimportant. During periods 
of structural change, consultation can pospone necessary adjustments. Then, the 
flexibility of the Anglo-Saxon model is needed.
A particular economic system will not dominate the others everywhere, 
because the characteristics of a country's economic institutions incorporate the 
values of that society. For example, a study of cultural values reveals that German 
people put more weight to uncertainty avoidance and collectivism than the 
inhabitants in the Anglo-Saxon countries do. On both items the score for the 
Netherlands is in the middle (see Hofstede 1982, pp. 122 and 158). Another more
recent study of the managers' aims in these three countries concludes that in the 
USA the managers are -  more than their counterparts in the Netherlands and 
Germany -  forced to deliver short-term growth of earnings per share (Weimer 1995, 
p. 339). These values are the results of historical processes which last for centuries 
instead of decades or years.6 It is unlikely that such long-lasting processes will 
change dramatically in a few years. The challenge of each society is to adapt its 
economic system to the needs of the present economic environment. Elements of 
another system might be useful, however, "societies should be fully aware of the 
positive and negative aspects of implementation of such alien elements" 
(Groenewegen 1997, p. 343).
From the previous paragraphs we conclude that, although the structural 
changes force adaptations of each system, basically the present variety of economic 
systems will remain in Europe. Since each model has its own merits, this diversity 
can be regarded an asset for Europe, in the sense that for every economic 
circumstance there is always a national model that is fit for handling the corre­
sponding challenges. This raises the question whether within Europe these models 
should compete with each other or that there is a need for co-ordination at the 
European level. We plead for a "coordinated" competition, i.e. competition forms 
the basis but is supplemented by European agreements which restrict it. Competition 
is good since it forces each society to adjust its institutions to changing 
circumstances. However, since no form of capitalism dominates the others in all 
circumstances, coordination is needed in order to assure that this competition is not 
too aggressive. Aggressive competition (subsidies, tax credits etc.) might give rise to 
retaliation or might destroy the institutional structure of another country. Both 
results destroy the advantages of Europe's cultural diversity.
6 Pott-Buter, for example, concludes from a comparative 
study of female labour participation rates in seven countries, 
that the relative low participation rates of Dutch females 
during the last century can be explained by the view on the 
family household as this came into existence in the Dutch 
Golden Age. At that time the family relationships of the rich 
bourgeois middle income classes became the dominant form of 
household behaviour. Underlying this model was that "the well­
being of all the members of a household was improved if men 
provided the financial resources and companionship and women 
were responsible for raising or maintaining the quality of 
life of the household This quality-oriented family model gave 
women working in their own households a higher status... " 
(Pott-Buter 1993, p. 48), and resulted in a low female parti­
cipation in the labour market.
8.6 Institutions and Culture Matter
Social capital is like a ratchet that is more easily turned in one direction than 
another; it can be dissipated by the actions of governments much more readily than 
those governments can build it up again (Fukuyama 1996, p. 362). Trust or social 
capital determines the performance of a society's institutions. Trust my not be truly 
exogenous; it may increase with good past performance of a society's institutions 
(see La Porta et al. 1997). The stable or self-enforcing systems of norms are a 
starting point for the explanation of institutional differences between countries. 
Deregulation may be at the expense of trust and commitment, or in general the 
social climate (trust, values and norms), the latter being a major source for good 
economic performance. It is the latter that has often been excluded from economic 
analyses and overlooked by policy makers in reshaping welfare states (Nyfer 1996). 
There is a strong cultural element in the way market institutions operate. Economic 
institutions are for their effectiveness and legitimacy dependent on other institutions 
and cultural values present in societies (Van Waarden 1997, p. 13). Once the regime 
is changed because it temporary cannot be sustained, the assumption on which it is 
based will be eroded, and it will be very difficult to re-establish the regime again 
(see Layard 1997). Thus in case an economy is performing badly, it may be wise to 
look at a country with a similar instead of a very different institutional structure and 
cultural background for obtaining ideas for improving the economy.
Since the German and Dutch economy are both variants of the Rhineland 
model, this book concentrated on a comparison between the institutional and 
economic structure of these two countries in order to investigate whether their 
institutions can be improved. Changes in institutional structure may be necessary 
given the challenges implied by internationalisation, new technologies, EMU, and 
demographic aging. In order to put this comparison into a broader perspective, the 
United Kingdom and the United States of America, representatives of the Anglo­
Saxon model, have been used as benchmarks. It appeared that the Rhineland and 
Anglo-Saxon countries systematically differ from each other with respect to the 
income distribution and the size of the government sector; in the Anglo-Saxon 
countries income is always more unevenly distributed and government expenditures 
are always smaller than in the Rhineland countries. These differences correspond 
with the prominent place of the individual in the Anglo-Saxon societies (see e.g. 
Hofstede, 1982, Figure 5.2, p. 158). In the Rhineland countries, especially in 
Germany, the collectivity is more important.
Since the beginning of the 1990s the Dutch economy is outperforming the 
economies of other European countries. These results are obtained by a particular 
mixture of individualistic and collective features of the Dutch society. On the one 
hand measures have been taken which have increased the responsibility of the 
individuals and firms for their actions. Examples are the reform of the laws on 
sickness and disability benefits. Of even more importance (at least for reducing the 
unemployment) is maybe that many have accepted temporary and part-time labour 
contracts. On the other hand the core of the Dutch success, wage moderation, is the
result of the consensus society. Soskice et al. argue that the structure of the industry 
and of the wage bargaining process in Germany differ so much from those in the 
Netherlands that copying the successful Dutch policies would be impossible. 
Although the two economies belong both to the Rhineland model, the cultural 
differences are in their view too large. If  this is true than the same argument could 
be applied even more forcefully to other countries in Europe (such as France and 
Italy). In our opinion it is correct that culture and differences in institutional 
arrangements matter for economic policy. The differences between countries in this 
respect along with other factors, such as size and specialisation, imply that policies 
which are successful in one country need not be the appropriate policies for other 
countries, even if  from a broader perspective these belong to the same model of the 
market system. Institutions have both advantages and disadvantages. This urges 
caution in relation to liberalisation initiatives in Europe. However, although cultural 
differences are important they should never be used as an excuse for delaying 
necessary adjustments.
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